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FOREWORD
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief

of· Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of
professional interest to officers of the naval service.

The thoughts and opinions. expressed in this publication are

those of· the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy

Department or of the Naval War College.
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MOMENfUM AS A FACTOR IN NATIONAL SECURITY.
A lecture delivered by

Reginald E. Gillmor

at the Naval War College
on May 8, 1950

My thesis is creative momentum, its components and char
acteristics and its relation to all development-good or bad, na�
tural or man made, political, military, administrative, scientific',
economic and industrial. My argument is that relative superiority
in: any field of development results from the product of the static
values and the momentum; a high static value will quickly lose
superiority if the momentum of its evolution to higher forms is
relatively low.
The evidence that I submit will fade .or become obsolete. What
I hope will remain is a small intellectual tool or way of thinking
which, when added to your many tools, may be of value in solving
the problems you will encounter in the pursuit of your profession.
As the first piece of evidence in support of the argument I
would Hke to develop for you a ·presumptive curve of growth of
the millions of species of life that now inhabit our planet. Com
petent biologists say the first organic cells were evolved from in
organic material about one thousand million years ago. For ap
proximately fl.ye hundred million years organic life was not suf
ficiently dense or complex to leave fossil records. Science tells us,

Mr; Gillmor is Vice President of the Sperry Corporation, and served,
in 1948 and 1949, as Vice Chairman of the National Security Re
sources Board. A Naval Academy 1rraduate; class of 1907, Mr. Gill
mor served as Fla1r Secretary to Admiral Sims, Commander of the
U. S. Naval Forces in European waters, durin1r World War I.

..
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however, that many points along the curve of evolution are marked
by organisms that attained stability i:ri ages past and still exist
today.
Some of the unicellular orgariisms �f ancient origin have
differential sensitivities which gave them the equivalent of sense
organs in various parts of their bodies. There is also evidence that
in their efforts to survive many of them developed cooperative re:
lationships. · An indication of the first step toward multicellular
cooperation is found in certain forms
of amoeba.
, When their feed.
.
ing grounds give out. these amoeba, in response to some mysterious
signal, quickly . gather ,together into worm-like forms, thus, by
cooperation a<!quiring a mobility which enables them to move with
comparative rapidity to new feeding grounds where they disperse. A
further step in evolution is found in certain slime molds which form
and disperse and in which the amoeba are specialized; some form
ing the head, some the stern, and some the. foot.
All single cells have a sort of immortality; that is, they
reproduce by fission. This was an obstacle to the evolution of new
species. For the first 500 million years, therefore, the curve of
increase of new species had a low exponentiality; that is, the up
'ward slope of the curve of growth was very gradual.
With the evolution of bi-sexualisrn and death, a very rapid
growth in the number of. species became possible and the growth
curve rose steeply with an increasing exponentiality. The curve
reached a plateau comparatively recently-probably between one
and ten million years ago. Some few species are .still disappearing
and some evolving but, generally speaking, there is now a plateau
in the number of sp�ies.

2
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.The eminent.French biologist, LecomtE¼ du Nouy, says that
the only evolution of any conseq"Qence still continui:r:ig is the spiritual
ahd.intellectual evolution of ma�; all other forms of life have either

failed to adapt and therefore ceased to exist or have become perfect
ly adapted and ceased. to evo,lvE¼. ..

Here, then, in number of species plotted·· against a billion

years of time is a curv� the slopes of vvhfoh show the growth ancl
"
decay of momentum in the evolution of life. A gradual slope for

the first half of the curve, turniilg upward into a steep slope fo:r

the last half of the curve, arid turning over toward

o:r plateau; at the upper part of the curve.

aii asymptote,

The basic factor which produced momentum in the develop

. ment of the countless species of organic life was conflict with the
adverse · forces of · environment. .: Many failed to survive.
dinosaurs, for example.

The

With little brains and big posteriors, they

managed by sheer strength and size, to survive for 140 million

years, but their momentum toward sizes and their lack of momentum

t<)ward brains eventually proved their undoing. They failed to adapt

to changing conditions and. disappeared. The same phenomenon is

· observable in the history of man-made organizations.

Big

posteriors and little brains are not a very alert or adaptable com-;

bination.

Every surv1vmg species is characterized by the means,

evolved to insure its. survival.

From the microbe to the elephant,

life is replete with the most intricate and amazing individual and
social mechanisms to serve this purpose.

For example, there is a beetle of the Meloid family which

lays its eggs near the burrows of certain mining bees.
hatch tiny lice.

The eggs

The lice seek flowers frequented by the bees
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and, -at precisely the right moment, hop on the bee's back and
hide in its. fur. There they stay until ·the bee has provisioned herself with pollen and honey. Then, at the moment when the bee
lays her egg, the tiny louse jumps. from the back of the bee and
lands on the egg, which it uses as life raft and larder for several
years while it goes through seven metamorphoses, finally emerging
as an adult beetle to start the life cycle all over again.
')

Only once does the tiny Meloid louse seek the flowers ; only
once does it jump on the bee's back; only once does it jump on
the egg. Survival required that some sort of memory cell must
continue through all of the transformations and tell the tiny organ
ism precisely what to do and precisely when to do it.
The survival mechanisms of all the two-winged insects
of which there are some fifty thousand species-include a gyro
scopic automatic pilot that is amazingly compact and effective, and
far superior to anything man has invented. The migratory birds
and homing pigeons are equipped with position finding mechanisms
-Lorans--the nature of which we can dimly understand although
the mechanisms are still a mystery. Many animals are physically
superior to man. And yet. in a . very short period of evolutionary
time man has become the lord of creation on this. planet. Let us
construct the curve of his evolutionary momentum.
Biologists tell us that man is of the order of primates, the
family. homonidae, the genus homo, and the species sapiens. The
order of primates probably evo.ved some 20 million years ago, the
family homonidae several million years later, and the genus homo
about one million years ago. The specie sapiens is comparatively
young, probably less then 100,000 years. It. is a very remarkable
fact that all men on this planet are of the same order, family,
genus and species-this is not true of any other higher animal. That
4
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it is trqe in the case of man is shown by the fact that all of the

species of whatever size or race can breed with each other and

produce fertile offspring.

Here again in the evolution of the species sapiens we can,

in .our imagination, construct the characteristic curve: A long,

gradual slope of evolution of the order of primates, the family

ho!Jlonidae, and the genus homo, followed by the evolution of a

species of such superior mentality that he was able to eliminate

all competing species of the genus and begin an evolution on a

steep slope to become the most superior form of life on the planet.

Although the · physical evolution of the species has practically

ceased, the intellectual and spiritual evolution continues on a curve

of high exponentiality.

This rapid evolution is due to man's

creative mind or, more accurately, to the creative minds of that
relatively small minority with innate ability to think in the

abstract, to make new contributions to knowledge, invention, and

to act together in bringing about specialization combined with
cooperation.

The curve of ·acquisition of man's knowledge is 'well illus

trated by the discovery of the 92 elements.

My friend, Buck

minster Fuller, has developed this curve by plotting these elements
vertically against time horizontally.

Nine of the elements (car

bon, lead, tin, mercury, silver, copper, sulphur, gold and iron)

were known and used prehistorically.

Therefore, Mr. Fuller's

curve begins with the discovery of arsenic in the year 1250.

This

discovery was probably an accident of an alchemist's trick but

was nevertheless the first recorded isolation of a chemical element.

Two hundred years elapsed before the discovery of the next ele
ment, antimony, about 1450.

to the next, phosphorus.

Then approximately 200 years more

Then approximately 60 years to cobalt

and platinum, about the year 1730.
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gradual ; then it turns up sharply and continues on a steep. slope

to the· completion of the basic curve in 1932 with the isolation of

the element alabamine.

This completion of the inventory of all

the 92 basic elements of the universe was, as Mr. Fuller says, an

attainment of epoch-making proportions.

Advancement continues

in the discovery and production of the super-atoms numbered above
92 and the radio-active isotopes of all the atoms.

It is interesting to see how our progress in science and en

gineering has been linked with the discovery and control of the 92

universal atomic building blocks.

Steel, which is the basis of our

industrial civilization, was developed less than 100 years ago after

the elements entering into it were isolated and made available.

Alloy after alloy and development after development has followed

the availability of more building blocks.

Now that we have them

all and are continually adding to the super-atoms and isotopes,
the possibilities are beyond the imagination.

In every branch of

the basic physical sciences, the curve of acquisition of knowledge
is similar to that of the atomic curve.
incline with no plateau in sight.

All are rising on a steep

In all group activities, and especially those of men, the fac

tors contributing to creative momentum are analogous to those in

mechanical momentum. Mass is represented by the total amount of
balanced,

specialized knowledge,

tributing to the effort.

experience and facilities con

Velocity is proportional to the cooperation

between those engaged in the effort.

Motive power is provided

by the urge to accomplish and the urge derives from various de

grees and forms of conflict including desire for reward, fear of
failure, competition, rivalry, criticism, hate, and even love.

When

all of the three factors (urge, knowledge and cooperation) are
large, momentum is quickly attained arid maintained or increased.

6
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When any one is lost or seriously depleted it may take a long

time to regain momentum and in the meantime competitive groups

may have attained such a high momentum that it is impossible
to overtake them.

The history of scientific and engineering progress in the

United States provides some interesting examples of the importance

� of momentum to technical achievement.

_Until comparatively re'

cent times the' rewards for achievement in pure science were low.

There were very few people in the field and therefore little com

petition.

As a consequence, most of the achievements in pure

science were made in other countries.

Only the last three ele

ments in the atomic scale, illinium, virginium and alabamine, were

, · discovered by Americans.

For the last twenty years we have been

rapidly gaining momentum in the pure sciences.

In engineering,

however, our competitive system and our large domestic market

has resulted in giving us a very high momentum over many decades.

In techni�al developments having military value we have

sometimes failed to recognize the importance of momentum and the
factors contributing to it.

New developments are surrounded with

unnecessary barriers of secrecy, thus removing them from the

stimulus of criticism and from the cooperation of those who might

contribute to the development. To be sure, we should do everything

we can to keep knowledge of our developments away from po

tential enemies, but we should never let this interfere with ob

taining .the cooperation and criticism of those on our side who

might add to the development.

The development and production of the atomic bomb was

frequently referred to as the best kept secret in the world. Actually,
it proved to be no secret at all.

One man, perfectly equipped to

understand it, had access to everything, learned everything, and
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transmitted everything to out potential enemies, notwithstanding

all the barriers of secrecy surrounding the whole operation and

every cell within it.

It is doubtful that our opponents profited
much from the information. ( Either their momentum was too

low to enable them to understand and make use of it or too high

in some previously chosen direction to permit them to change. The

barriers undoubtedly kept the momentum of the development at

a, lower point than it would have been if there had been free and

complete cooperation and criticism between the many ,carefully

screened people who were working on the multitudinous phases of
the problem.

The same kind of thing happened with the torpedo. , Un

til after World War I it was competitive.

In Germany the com

petition and criticism evidently continued under the fascist state

with consequent high momentum in development.

With us the

stimuli of competition was reduced and, notwithstanding the con

scientious efforts of the many fine men who were working on the

problem, the momentum was not sufficient to give us a superior

torpedo when we entered World War II and had to compete with
the Germans and Japanese.

In my own field of military instrumentation I have- seen

many examples which emphasize the importance of momentum in
technical developments.

When the momentum of development is

high enough every example of military instrumentation becomes
obsolete very rapidly.

If, notwithstanding every effort to keep it

secret, the enemy should learn about it at any particular point,

it would do him very little good.

In fact, it might mislead him

into believing that a particular development is the last word,
whereas it might only be the beginning.

My company had an example of that in 1939 when the FBI

8
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discovered that one of our employees was conveying technical
'information to the Germans. The spy had been well chosen; he

wa.s an experienced designer ·and very skilled in taking verbal

descriptions from engineers and reducing them to drawings. His

· ·.. record was excellent.

American born and educated, 15 years of

experience with other companies engaged in classified develop

ments for the Armed Forces of the United States, and 10 years
of experience with us.

Our spy never took a paper or drawing from our building.

AHof his information was in his head and was reduced to paper in
.the basement of his home.

He transmitted it by mail to an ac

complice who micro-photographed it and conveyed it through

: devious channels to a steward on a Pan American plane flying to
Lisbon where it was transferred to a German emissary.

The FBI discovered him early in his activities. and asked

us to keep him until they could nail down the others in the chain.

They intercepted. everything he sent, showed it to us and asked us

to approve its transmission if it was of no importance.'

The in

teresting thing was that, after consulting the Government Services

involved, we agreed to the transmission of many of his drawingi..

We were quite c�nfident that none of the information transmitted

would do the Germans any good.

Even complete.information would

probably have been of little value.

The Germans had acquired

momentum in other directions and could not change. Eventually,

after a year and a half from the time our spy was first discovered,

the thirty;.two German agents in the ring· were taken simultaneously

by the FBI, were convicted, and are now serving time in Leaven
worth.

Even when you want to bring a friendly ally up to date in

a new development it is sometimes very difficult because he does
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not have the background momentum or has acquired momentum in
some other direction. This phenomena was observable on many
occasions in the cooperation between Great Britain and· the United
States durini the last war. Sometimes they would be ahead of us
and sometimes we ahead of them, and it was always difficult to
change over from one line of development to another.
The greatest danger in the cancellation of the 65,000-ton
aircraft carrier might be the loss of momentum in the development
of that type of ship. Many of the men who were working together
in the evolution of new designs for aircraft carriers must have
been dispersed, and the stimulus removed from those who remained,
with consequent loss of momentum in the development of this very
,important type of ship. During the Pax Britannica the British
were not content with their superior naval power; they continued
to develop new types of ships, such as the dreadnought and the bat
tle cruiser, and thereby gained momentum in ship design which
kept them superior to all other navies for many years.
In the social sciences, if they can be called "sciences," the
curve is still on a gradual slope with low exponentiality. There
have been some examples of a steep rise, especially in the field
of government. For example, the Athenian Republic, in a period
of 80 years, rose with great rapidity, but complacency led to a
turning of the curve and its termination by the conquest of
Alexander, the Great. In modern times our own Republic is the
most progressive example of balance between increasing special
ization and increasing cooperation by means of individual. free
dom. Young as �e are, it is an extraordinary fact that, among
all the nations of the Twentieth Century, we have the longest
history of unchanged political philosophy.

10
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In general, however, world society is still in a very un

'$table condition.

The early conflicts which led to the extinction

of other species of the genus homo continued for many centuries,

with the result that the less fit of the species were forced to the less
desirable portions of the planet.

Many of these groups were so

weak that they have remained where they are without protest.

Others have gradually gathered momentum in an effort to break

'" out of their boundaries .and spread to richer portions of the earth
and this tendency has been accelerated by improved coµimuni

cations.

This was the case with the Japanese.

For more than 2000

years they were content with their islands and chose to have
very little communication with · the outside world.

Following the

visit of Commodore Perry they began to learn how to build a

better life for themselves by acquisition of scientific knowledge

and by the development of industrialization.

Their rise as an in

dustrial nation followed a very steep curve and resulted in a

momentum which eventually carried them into a war which they

could not win, with consequent loss of their position as a world
power.

They can again become an important industrial nation,

but it is hard to conceive that they could in the foreseeable future

acquire any serious military potential.

In this day of rapid de

velopment of practically every offensive and defensive weapon, the

possibilities that the Japanese or the Germans could acquire any

serious military potential is about the same as the possibility that

a Model T Ford standing at the curb could catch a Cadillac pass
ing by at 100 miles an hour.
An eminent

Japanese

educator,

when

asked

why

his

country made the blunder of going to war with us, replied: "We

made three disastrous errors: First, we over-estimated the pow�r

of the Germans; second, we underestimated your great industrial
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momentum and its power to produce and transport vast quantities
of weapons, equipment and supplies; and, third and most serious, we

mistook your disagreements and diversities of opinion for weak

ness instead of the great strength they really are."

American com

petition and diversity of opinion provides the motive power for
productive momentum.

As you know better than I, our only serious competitor is

Russia.

For centuries they have been confined to a relatively un

favorable portion of the earth.

land.

They have vast areas of waste

Their sources of food and raw materials are inadequate in

many portions of their country.

Transportation facilities con

necting the richer lands with the poorer lands are difficult to
establish.

They have inadequate outlets to the sea.

With an in

,;;tinctive mass urge they gathered momentum for centuries under

the Czars.

This leadership degenerated and was replaced by a

police state which has intelligently employed every modern tech

nique of ideology,

infiltration,

communication,

discipline

technical development to build a strong military power.

and

During the last war the Russians acquired from the Allies

and the Germans an enormous amount of technical information and

have further added to their technical abilities by pressing into serv
ice many capable German scientists and engineers.

From consid- ·

erable contact with them from 1929 to 1936, I have the im

pression that both the mass and velocity of their technical progress

is still considerably lower than ours, but the urge is very great.

The greatest weakness of the Russian State derives from the

suppression of criticism.

Stalin recognized this in a letter he

wrote to Maxim Gorky in 1930.
TIME Magazine,
criticism.

In this letter, as reported by

Stalin said: "We

cannot

do

without

self

Without it will come immediate stagnation, rotting

12
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away of the apparatus, growth of bureaucratism, undermining of

creative initiative in the working class."

What Stalin feared has

happened. Whether or not their tendency toward stagnation can
be compensated for by other factors remains to be seen.
The Russians have several obvious advantages. Their popu

lation is widely dispersed with no large concentrations of people

or industrial power.

Because of the vast size of their country

and the poor transport communications, they have probably had to
make each industrial area self-sufficient.

Their totalitarian govern

ment makes it possible to deliver a heavy blow against us with

out warning.

From all accounts their military forces are superior

in number of planes, submarines, ground forces and equipment.

It

is doubtful if the free world will attempt in peacetime

to match the size of the Russian military forces.

Our strength lies

in our large engineering and industrial momentum.

factors contributing to that momentum are large.

All of the

The urge from

hope of reward, competition and other factors is much greater

than that of the Russians.

The mass, represented by specialized

knowledge, experience and facilities, is very great, and, notwith

standing the competition, the cooperation within individual in

dustries and between them, by means of engineering and manage

ment societies, is very high.

We ·have several serious vulnerabil

ities, among them being large industrial concentrations, especially

in our port cities, a very high degree of interdependence of each
industry on many others, the fact that most of our industries have

a high momentum in peacetime production which would have to be

redirected for war.

All of our vulnerabilities would be aggravated

if we were attacked by surprise, for then it would be extremely

difficult to accomplish the redirection of our industrial power and to

compensate for its interdependence.

..
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Because of the importance and complexity of the problem
of conversion of our industrial power, the Congress created the Na
tional Security Resources Board and charged it with the responsi
bility of providing the President with plans for mobHizing and
utilizing all of the resources of the country, human, material, fi
nancial and industrial. Fortunately, this vitally important agency
now has as chairman one of the most able men in our Government.
Under his leadership it will gain momentum rapidly.
It is my great hope that within this year the Resources
Board, the Munitions Board, the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, the technical and procurement branches of the Armed
Forces, and all of industry will be working in close cooperation in
the development of mobilization plans which will provide for the
quick conversion and expansion of our resources under any contin
gency that can be foreseen. When such plans have been evolved our
vulnerability will be greatly lessened, though it may never complete
ly disappear.
In conclusion, let me shape in a few words the small intellect
ual tool which I wish to leave with you. The attainment and main
tenance of superiority in any field of endeavor is dependent upon
the momentum in that endeavor. The motive power for creating
that momentum is derived from the urge for its accomplishment
and the urge is derived from a great variety of factors, among them
being hope of reward, fear of failure, criticism, competition, rivalry
and desire to excel. The equivalent of mass is the total of balanced
knowledge, experience and facilities assembled for the endeavor.
. The equivalent of velocity is derived from the cooperation between
an those concerned with the effort. The factors contributing to
urge sometimes conflict with those contributing to cooper�tion; in
that case it is the resultant of urge and cooperation that counts.
Free cooperation is obviously J{etter than forced cooperation. Free

14
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cooperation in any group can be greatly increased if every individual

"knows what is expected of him and is made to feel that his position
in the group is secure.

Superiority in any endeavor can be quickly

-lost if its momentum with relation to competing endeavors is
lessened.

If you want to know what the score is going to be, try to

figure out what the momentum is.
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THE MUNITIONS BOARD AND NATIONAL STRATEGY
A lecture delivered by

Rear Admiral Morton L. Ring, USN
at the Naval War College
on May 11, 1950

I would like to discuss this morning the work of the Muni
tions, Board and tell you something about the industrial plans be
ing developed and the measures which are being carried out to sup
port current and future military operations.
You will note that I use the word support. This word key
notes the role of the Munitions Board in its relation to national
strategy.
If military men have any distinguishing specialty which sets
them apart from their civilian brothers, it is their proclivity for
teamwork and organization. It is a natural tendency because it
is based on the knowledge that teamwork is essential. For a team
to function effectively it must be well organized.
And so, for centuries, when military men have been given a
,iob to accomplish, they immediately have turned their thoughts to
how to organize to do it.
Now whether the elements of a military organization are
identified as Bureaus, or G-ls, G-2s, G-3s, or G-4s or directorates
of training, intelligence, operations, etc., we nevertheless recognize

Rear Admiral Ring is Director for Military· Supply, Munitions
Board. A Supply Corps Officer, he has · held the position of Vice.
Chief of the Material Division, Office of the Secretary of the Navy.
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the need for some men to concentrate on personnel matters, others
to concentrate on intelligence, others .on operations (strategy and
tactics), and still others on logistics. Of these, three play a support

ing role to the fourth. Intelligence, personnel and logistics all owe
their existence to the necessity for supporting the people engaged
in operations.
Of these supporting elements that I have mentioned, there

is one which most accurately describes the area in which the Muni
tions Board specializes.

This is the area of logistics.

In its broad sense, logistics embraces all activities necessary
to build, support and maintain fighting forces.
is the broad ef
fort based upon the productive capacity and manpower of a nation.
It extends through successive phases of planning and through the

It

procurement and distribution of manpower and material to theatres

of military operations. It is a process by which the raw war-ma�ing

potential of a nation is translated into military forces that are em
ployed against the enemy in pursuit of strategic and tactical ob
jectives.

At the top-most level the logistician must bridge the gap

between two activities, one of which is almost fully military and the

other civilian and economic.

He has a twofold responsibility.

The

logistician is required to make military requirements intelligible to

industry so that it can produce equil)ment and supplies '.

He also

has to see that the logistic capabilities, including the nation's
economic capabilities, are reflected in strategic and tactical cal

culations.

He must act as the link between the war front and the home

front, for the logistic process is at one and the same time the

18
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military element in the nation's economy and the economic element
in its military operations.
In World War II, more than ever before in military history,
operations were conditioned by "weight of materiel." By "weight of
materiel" is meant all supplies and equipment used by, or useful
to, the armed forces in adequate quantities to permit them to ac
complish effectively their mission of national security. The ability
to mass materiel rather than men in a given area became, in gen
eral, the governing factor in preparing for an offensive.
Circumstances which I need not detail here gave us the
time needed to prepare this materiel. It seems quite evident from
.the record that the organizing of our logistic support for World War
II was for a long time inadequate to support major offensive opera
tions and was enormously wasteful.
Our victory in World War II was the result of a number of
factors. We had fighting men of great courage and ability. We
had friends on the battlefronts who held the line until we could
prepare and join them. We had enemies who made some grave mis
takes. We had superb military and civilian leadership. We were
convinced that right was on our side, and we entertained no
thought of losing.
But our greatest advantage, and it proved to be sufficient
to swing victory to our side, was American industry and its ability
to mass-produce the goods of war in a volume that almost defies
comprehension.
Just by way of reminder, I might say that in addition to
millions of other items, large and small, we turned out during the
war nearly 300,000 airplanes, 87,000 tanks, 80,000 landing craft,
RESTRICTE.D
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17 million rifles, 21/; million trucks, and 4½ million tons of artillery

shells.

Axis.

This was the unforeseeable factor that lost the war for the
They had not dreamed-nobody had ever dreamed-that

such a mighty arsenal could be developed so fast.

When our Presi

dent, shortly after we were attacked, announced America's inten

tion to produce immediately these vast quantities of munitions and

other machinery of war, the laughs and jeers of German leaders

rang·throughout the world.

They had good reason to laugh. They

were industrial experts and they had spent many years building up
their war machine.

And they were very nearly. proved right.

Some of the dark

est days in the history of this country followed Pearl Harbor.

What armed forces we had were meagerly armed and equipped.

Our troops went bravely into the first bitter campaigns with far

less in the way of modern arms and equipment than we knew they
should have.

Better things were on the way; they just weren't

ready yet; and the war couldn't wait for them.

We came closer than many people realize to losing the war

because we were late-perilously late-in converting our industry

to wa:r production.

Donald Nelson, the Chairman of the War. Pro

duction Board, expressed the considered opinion that we would
have been beaten before we got started had our country bordered
on Germany.

It would have been the greatest irony in history had

this catastrophe befallen a nation whose potential strength and

industrial output, when finally geared to the production of war

goods, exceeded by far any similar effort in the history of man.

cost.

But we succeeded with tremendous effort and at staggering
In the desperate and convulsive adjustments to an all-out

20
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wartime economy, we learned bitter lessons, which we filed for

future reference.

Nobody involved in that effort can ever forget

the costly and frightening difficulties, and nobody could recommend

that we attempt such a job again under similar circumstances•

. The unhappy fact is that we can never again expect to have

the breaks we had in World War II.

Our salvation then was time

-two years of general preparation before we were attacked, and

another year of protection by our Allies after we were attacked,
before we began to throw our full weight into the fight.
will never have all of those advantages again.

But we

And this means

that we must ourselves maintain such a military posture-and

help our friends to maintain such a military posture-that any ag

gressor would be discouraged from attacking us or any of our
friends.

In July of 1947 the President signed the National Secur

ity Act whicli created a national security team.

It

provided for a

systematic organization of civilian and military mobilization plan

ning.

This "Unification Act", as it is sometimes called, brought

our entire military force under a single cabinet member, the Secre
tary of Defense.

It

unified military planning in the field of indus

trial mobilization. In August of last year Congress made certain
changes in the Act, particularly giving the Secretary of Defense

authority, direction and control over the military departments and
other agencies of the Department of Defense.

This National Security Organization consists of three levels

or echelons: the non-military agencies reporting to the President;

the Office of the Secretary of Defense ; and the Departments of

the Army, Navy, and Air Force.·
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The non-military agencies are: (1) The National Security
Council which advises the President with respect to the integrat
ion of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national
security, and (2) the National Security Resources Board which ad
vises the President with respect to the coordination and integration
of civilian, industrial and military mobilzation plans.
Within the Department of Defense, the Act and its amend
ments created four staff agencies to the Secretary of Defense-
the Armed Forces Policy Council, to advise the Secretary of Defense
on top policy; the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop strategic plans;
the Research and Development Board to coordinate scientific re
search for military purposes; and the Munitions Board, which is
the industrial mobilization and logistics planning arm of the De
partment of Defense.
The operating echelon of the national security team con
sists of the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force.
At this point I would like to cover briefly the relationship
which exists between the Munitions Board and the various other
'arms' of the national security team.
Of the organizations which I have just described, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, the Logistics Groups of the
three Departments, and the National Security Resources Board are
agencies most intimately involved in logistic planning and coordi
nation.
It must be emphasized that the National Security Resources
Board engages in planning for all requirements and coordinates
over-all planning for military, industrial and civilian mobilization.

22
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The Munitions Board on the other hand supervises the de

velopment of military requirements which include end items, to-:
_
gether with the manpower facilities and transportation required
in the production of finished munitions.

Another way of stating this division of responsibility is to

point out that the National Security Resources Board does for the
nation as a whole what the Munitions Board does for the Depart

ment of Defense in the economic and industrial mobilization fields.

.The National Security Resources Board is concerned with two

'major jobs: (1) national mobilization planning and (2) measures
to be taken during peacetime to keep our resources in readiness

for mobilization.

Mobilization planning, from the National Security Resources

.· Board point of view, involves identification of problems which will

arise if the nation must move from a peacetime to a wartime situ-

• ation, and the development of measures necessary to resolve these
. problems. It requires consideration and development of all measures
to mobilize effectively the Nation's human, natural, productive,
and financial resources to meet wartime needs.

A specific example of how this relationship between the

National Security Resources Board, or a similar wartime control
agency, and the Munitions Board would operate in wartime may

be in order. The National Security Resources Board makes broad

allocations of materials and manpower to the Department of De

fense and to

other

claimant agencies as well.

The Munitions

Board makes allocations of facilities· and materials among the

Army, Navy and Air Force and establishes priorities and sched

ules governing their procurement programs.

Matters pertaining

to price control, rationing, wage stabilization, monetary policy,

and over-all utilization of small business fall within the purview
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of the National Security '.Resources Board or some other agency
such as an Office of War Mobilization.·
Another example may be useful to you. The Munitions Board

is interested in the petroleum products, the iron ore, and the tin

av;ailable for military programs and· makes allocations of these
materials among the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The National

Security Resources Board necessarily makes plans involving the

same materials but it concerns itself with the allocation of the
Nation's

total supplies

among several claimant agencies of which

one claimant is the Department of

Defense.

The second major job of the National Security Resources
Board concerns current policies and programs, or peacetime pol
icies and programs, through which the nation may achieve an
adequate state of readiness against the eventuality of a future war.
The policies and programs deal with such matters as stockpiling of

strategic and critical materials, training of skilled manpower, and

the wide range of other measures being undertaken currently to

keep industry and the armed forces continually prepared to meet
the needs of a possible wartime situation.

The Munitions Board

looks to the National Security Resources Board for broad policy

guidance on preparedness programs in order to coordinate fully

the military preparedness measures.

To this end, the Munitions

Board interests itself not only in, the military requirements for

strategic and critical materials, and skilled manpower, but all

conceivable dli!vices which will facilitate and speed-up tlie transi

tion from peacetime to wartime conditions.

Some of these devices

which will be discussed in detail later are: assembling of :mobili'

zation requirements of the Armed Forces; production planning
with industry; developing a standard cataloging and specification
system; and establishment of uniform procurement regulations.

24
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged with the preparation

of strategic and logistical plans for the direction of the military

·forces.
plans.

All actions of the Munitions Board are in support of these

The requirements which we use to make production plans

are those computed by the departments based on Joint Chiefs of
Staff plans and given the seal of approval by the Joint Chiefs.

In its simplest terms, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tell us what will

be needed for mobilization and the Munitions Board prepares the

industrial plans to fulfill these needs.

We advise the Joint Chiefs

of Staff on the logistic and industrial feasibility of their strategic

plans and they determine what adjustments will be made in these

plans in order that industry can adequately support military needs.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff. advise us of the priority in which equip

ment and supplies will be needed and we make production plans in

accordance with" those priorities.

When the National Security Act was passed, it contained

no clearly defined. line in the logistic field.

However, on the basis

of experience in the last two years, we have worked out an under�

standing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Munitions Board haEt

responsibility for what we call "producer logistics" and the econ

omy or business aspects of "consumer logistics."

The remainder

of the logistic field, which we call the command aspects of con

sumer logistics, is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to clarify the use · of these terms,. "producer logis

tics" is defined as all logistic activities up to the time that a mili

tary end item enters· our military distribution system.
point on, the field is called "consumer logistics."

From that

The Research and Development·Board has the responsibility

of advising the Munitions Board, as early as possible, of any new

developments, both in the way of new materials and end items which
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may require new production processes and schedules. The Munitions
- Board, in turn, must convert these new developments into adjust
ed requirements and production plans.
Within the Department of Defense, the Army, Navy, and Air
Force are the operating agencies in industrial matters. Their
representatives not only participate in planning for industrial
mobilization but they then convert planning into actions. The
viewpoints andconsiderations of the staff and operating agencies
of the departments bear on the formulation of Munitions Board
programs. It is through the military departments that the Muni
tions Board programs are carried to successful conclusions.
So far, I have just made general statements regarding the
Organization for National Security and the relationship which the
Munitions Board has to other branches of this organization. Before
we proceed to more detailed remarks concerning the Munitions
Board's program and fields of operation, I would like to give you
a brief sketch of its organization.
The Board itself consists of a civilian chairman, Mr. Hubert
E. Howard, and one member each from the three departments. At
present, the Munitions Board members are Mr. Eugene M. Zuckert,
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force; Mr. John T. Koehler, As
sistant Secretary of the Navy; and Mr. Archibald S. Alexander,
Assistant Secretary of the Army.
The· Chairman of the Board directs and supervises our staff
through the Director of the Staff. The Director of the Staff is
assisted by three staff directors; one for Industrial Programs, one
for Milit3:ry Programs, and one for Military Supply. Both the
Chairman and the Director of the Staff are assisted by Advisors in
such fields as economics, law and legislation, and public information.
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The Director for Industrial Programs is concerned with
production planning, the acquisition of strategic and critical ma
terials, the maintenance of reserves of industrial plants and equip
ment, materials, construction, and manpower. This group looks ..
toward industry.
The Director for Military Supply concerns himself with the
assignment of purchase responsibility, development of procurement
regulations, standardization, cataloging, and small-business aspects.
In the field of supply management, he concerns himself with such
matters as material control, material handling, maintenance and
salvage, transportation, traffic management, and communications.
This directorate looks down into the business functions of the de
partments.
The third director, the Director for Military Programs, con
cerns himself with �he coordination of mobilization requirements
and with international programs, which include foreign military
aid, export controls, and planning for economic warfare. This di
rectorate also handles all internal planning, coordinates variou'-3
programs of the Munitions Board, works out our relationships with
other military agencies and departments of the Government, and
· supervises budget matters in the field of industrial mobilization
planning. This group deals with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
planners in the departments.
You will note that our organization is on a functional basis.
There is one exception to the organizational structure: Three com�
modity divisions have been created as focal points for coordinating
end items that are considered critical enough to the armed forces to
require treatment on a commodity basis. These are the Divisions
for Aircraft, Petroleum, and Electronics.
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The Munitions Board is a staff organization of the Depart

ment of Defense dealing in policy and it has certain statutoI,"Y func
tions from which its plans and programs are derived.· llowever,

a simple way to remember the Munitions Board plans and pro

grams that will be necessary in case of an emergency is to tp.ink

of what activities would be required to ptoduce an end item such
as a submarine, or an airplane, or a tank.

First of all, we must

know the number of the item that will be required; and this will

include such things as initial issue, stock levels, replacement

quantities, and pipeline requirements.

Production facilities are

needed, so we have a production allocation program. Machine tools
are needed, manpower is needed, electric power, water, housing

for labor, transportation, and raw materials to make the item.
Security plans are required to protect the activities.

All of these

should indicate the nature of the programs that must be prepared

and adjµsted by the Munitions Board in consonance with the
strategic plans and the civilian economy.

One of the primary requisites for assuring industrial pre

paredness is informing industry of what it will be expected to

manufacture in an emergency.

Before this information can be.

furnished in sufficient completeness and accuracy, a fundamental

step must be accomplished.

This is to find out what and how

much the Army, Navy, and Air Force will need in time ·of war.
This is not the "what" and "how much" of material alone; it must
include all the material and personnel in the right place at the
right time.

These needs are called "requirements." Specific data,

collected in peacetime on wartime requirements, when added to
similar data for civilian wartime needs, are the foundation upon
which can be built the military, industrial, civilian, and national
economic mobilization planning for the support of a war effort.·
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Our Requirements Program is the end product of our stra

tegic planning cycle.

This cycle begins with a JCS strategic plan

which outlines forces and missions for the Army, Navy and Air
Force.

The military departments in turn translate the missions

assigned in the strategic concept into operational plans, adding the

necessary supporting and service troops.

Then they have to figure

what these troops will need and the times and places they will

need them.

If a particular plane is more important to our cam

paign plans for a certain area than a particular tank is in another

area, then we can translate this fact into industrial programs to

gether with the order of precedence they must assume.

Not only

for the manufacture of the plane itself, but for procuring the fuel

,�o run it, the ammunition it will use, the clothes and equipment its
crew will need, the ground equipment necessary to service the
plane in its combat area, the transportation to take the main
tenance personnel and equipment to the area.

I will list the thirteen categories
of requirements that are
I

considered in industrial mobilizaton planning: Manpower; ma-

terials; components; construction; equJpment and supplies; com

munication facilities; transportation service; petroleum products;

water supply; production equipment; electric power; gas; and coal
and coke.

The calculation of requirements in sufficient detail to be use

ful is an intricate and time-consuming proce�s.

Where military

decision and judgment are necessary, these calculations must be

made carefully and deliberately.

Where the work involved is more

clerical in nature, requiring the translation of specific troop units
into end-item requirements, the work may be expedited by the use
of mechanical and electrical calculating syst�ms.

The procedures

to be followed by the Army, Navy, and Air Force in compiling and
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presenting their mobilization requirements are prescribed in the
"Requirements Manual", a publication of the Munitions Board.
In order that we may be reasonably certain that the opera
tional plans can be supported by American Industry, prior to the
detailed caJculation of many thousands of items, we conduct what
we call a 'feasibility test'. Since we can't take all of the items,
we select some 300 important end Items, such as particular types
of planes, naval vessels, tanks, trucks, and electronics; steel, cop
per, aluminum, petroleum, construction, and merchant shipping.
If the strategic plan appears infeasible from an industrial point of
view the JCS will either modify the plan to bring it within the
capability of American industry, or the JCS will elect to take
calculated risks as to short supplies of ·various needed items. De
pendent upon the answer given by the JCS, the military depart
ments proceed with the detailed computation of requirements, with
a reasonable assurance as to the degree to which they can be pro
duced by industry in the event of war.
The Munitions Board consolidates and reviews the total re
quirements as they are prepared by the three departments and ar
ranges for necessary adjustments. When completed, the consoli
dated mobilization requirements are presented to the Secretary of
Defense with recommendations for their adoption. The Munitions
Board presents and defends these requirements before the National
Security Resources Board, and then acts as a claimant agency for
the Department of Defense in the allocation of all national resources.
The Requirements Program provides the information neces
sary for the operation of all other industrial mobilization programs.
It becomes, therefore, the central or key problem requiring solution.
Once the requirements of the three departments have been
established, it is obvious that the next step is to determine where

so
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and

how

these needs can be fulfilled.

No single program of the

Munitions Board will provide the answer to the

where

and

how

but

rather -a series of inter-related programs and plans are necessary.
In World War II we found that a strong industrial economy
that can make automobiles, refrigerators, and other consumer items
cannot be converted over night into making weapons and supplies
needed by the military services.

We also found that it takes many

months to produce a satisfactory finished product from a newly
constructed plant.

Such a period of grace cannot be expected if

we become involved in another conflict. We need stand-by plants
which can be converted quickly irito war production.

Our Plant

Reserve Program, which follows Public Laws 364 and 883, author
izes the military departments to maintain plants owned or con
trolled by the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

These plants are main- �

tained in stand-by condition so as to be .available for production of
military supplies in an emergency. In addition, military and other
· . Federally owned plants that are surplus to our current needs, can
be sold or leased with

a "national security clause."

Under this

clause, the Government retains an interest in the plant which re
quires the buyer or lessee to maintain the plant in such condition
that it can be converted to war production within 120 days.

Sur

plus plants for which we cannot find a prospective buyer or lessee
are in the hands of the General Services Administration.

It holds

them. in reserve as custodian.
Considered as a whole, these various reserve plants, to
gether with the plants that have been sold but which still make

their original .product or a similar product, amount to over 900 of
the 1,595 plants that the Government constructed during World
War

II.

RESTRICTED

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950

31

33

Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 6, Art. 1

RESTRICTED

Reserve plants are obviously inadequate to meet the military
requirements in event of an emergency. To fill the,gap, there is a
program for pre-planning with industry for the manufacture of
essential items of material. This is known as the Production Al- .
location Program.
The over-all objective of this program is to develop plans,
in· consultation with industrial management, that will enable a
quicker change-over to war . production should the need ari.se.
Specifically, the objective is to:
-

.

·.·

'

('

(1) Locate now the manufacturing capacity that will be re
quired for wartime production of essential supplies and equip
ment, and

(2) Develop specific and realistic production schedules that can
be converted into production contracts in time of mobilization.
It should be not.ed here that Industry's participation in
the Production Allocation Program, while vital to its success, is
entirely voluntary. No production preparedness plans requiring
the participation of management will be effected without manage
ment's consent and cooperation.
When you think of this task in terms of the thousands of
items required to make war, and the thousands of plants needed
to make these items, the job seems almost impossible.
The wartime requirements for articles of a military nature
(the production of which in peacetime is generally confined to a
few Government arsenals on little or more than a pilot line basis)
presents the problem of. industrial conversion. This change of ex
isting industrial facilities to the production of military items is
one of the first and most pressing necessities of industrial mobiliza
tion. The problem is not only one of conversion, but of rapid con32
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· versicm. The Industry Preparedness Measures Program is in
tended to shorten the time between awarding of contracts and
reaching the highest possible wartime production rates for such
items by means of production studies in peacetime.
As a general rule, the items considered for study have no
commercial counterpart. Exploratory studies are made by indus
try in order to discover what bottlenecks might develop in war
time, and recommendations are made to the departments on the
best way to remove them. Then, if appropriate, additional con
tracts are let based on the early studies. These might involve
plant layouts, planning for important components, actual tools

might be purchased, and in some cases, small quantities of the item
are manufactured in order to test the tools and to train and main
tain the know-how of the working force.

In the discussion of the Reserve Plant Program, it was
. pointed out that the intent of the program is to preserve the in
dustrial potential of our reserve plants for possible future military
production. In like manner we must provide for reserves of pro
uction equipment, such as machine tools, handling and processing
equipment, etc. For this purpose we have established the Indus
trial Production Equipment Program. These reserves are in add
ition to the items of production equipment that are part of the
plants held in the Plant Reserve Program. Most of the equipment
was supplied from postwar surplus inventories under a program
operated jointly by the three military departments. Maintenance

of the reserves and the inspection, acquisition, and allocation of the

relatively small number of surplus items still available are now
coordinated by the Munitions Board. On 1 April 1950, there were
approximately 100,000 items in the military reserve and 15,000 in
the national reserve. Then some 59,000 other items are in actual
use by the military departments or by their contractors.
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I have discussed two important factors in production-in
dustrial plants and equipment. A third factor is production ma
terials. One of the most important programs to the Nation is the
stockpiling of strategic and critical materials that will not be
available in sufficient quantities in time of war. Our Stockpiling
Program is a national program, not just a military. one. The
Munitions Board acts as central staff agency for the entire program
and coordinates the activities of other government agencies that
can assist in the stockpiling effort. The actual purchasing is done
by the Federal Supply Service of the General Service Adminis
tration.
On the basis of materials surveys made by the Munitions
Board, 71 materials have been chosen for the stockpile. Of these,
52 are minerals. Only 8 are produced in this country to any great
extent, and only 27"are produced in this country at all. This stock
pile, when completely filled, will cost approximately 4 billion dol
lars at present prices. We hope to have about 50 percent of the
materials actually in the stockpile by the end of this fiscal year.
I mentioned to you earlier that, · although the Munitions
Board is organized on a functional basis, it does give special at
tention, on a commodity basis, to three types of requirements.
These are aircraft, petroleum and electronic equipment. The reasons
for selecting these commodities for individual treatment are:
(1) The special military importance attached to the end items
involved in these three programs.
(2) The integrated nature of the industries involved.
(3) A recognition of the high priority which these commodities
will have in drawing upon the Nation's resources.
34
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( 4) The fact that because all three military departments are
so deeply concerned with the use of these commodities that it is

not feasible to assign procurement responsibility to any one de
partment.
I have discussed with you the most important of the Muni

tions Board Program which will reach full implementation only
in time of war.

There are other activities of the Board which are

aimed primarily toward increasing the efficiency of the Depart

ment of Defense--those activities which will produce economy in

men, money, and time.

These programs might be called our war

preparedness program, or supply management.

.

The concept of a supply system was well expressed by the

Hoover Commission report.

It stated that the following primary

. phases must be included in the word supply:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Specifications,

or the task of establishing standards for

the property to be purchased.

Purchasing,

or the acquisition of property.

Traffic Management,

or the transporting of property from

the point of purchase or storage to the point of need.

Inspection,

or insuring adherence of property to purchase

specifications.

Property identification,

or the task of cataloging .prop

erty under a standard system so. as to facilitate identi

fication.
6.
7.

Storage and issue,

or the storing of necessary reserves of

property and their distributio:q when needed.

Property utilization,

or the task of seeing that property
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is efficiently used, adequately maintained and suitably dis
posed of when no longer needed.
To any one of the seven primary phases of supply this
speaker could well devote his whole effort. Suffice it to say that
the Munitions Board is devoting extensive effort to each of these
elements of our "readiness for war" program. We are convinced
that sound supply management policies will assist in extracting
the utmost return from the dollars now budgeted for this pur
pose. We feel very strongly that we can no longer plan for a war
where we will have inexhaustible resources of men, money. and
materials. We may at any time pass from the status of a "have
nation" to that of a "have-not nation" and we must plan accordingly.
Thus far, I have discussed the major steps which the De
partment of Defense, operating through the Munitions Board, is
taking to increase the industrial mobilization potential of the
United States.
Now let me turn for a few moments to current interna
tional affairs. In this respect, I wish to discuss, in very broad
terms, the industrial capabilities for war of the North Atlantic
Treaty nations. Plans have not yet progressed sufficiently be
tween the United States and the various allied foreign governments
to determine their combined industrial capabilities for war. The
Munitions Board, however, does have responsibilities in con
nection with the Military Production and Supply Board of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I will briefly outline the
Organization and then discuss the functions and planning now
being carried on by the Military Production and Supply Board.
The North Atlantic Treaty provides for a collective se
curity arrangement among nations of the North Atlantic area. The
36
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss6/1

RESTRICTED
38

-

Naval War College: June 1950 Full Issue

RESTRICTED
·Treaty is a 20 year agreement for the purpose . of. common de
fense.
The top organization is the Council, which is composed of
,the foreign ministers of the signatory countries. The U. S. mem..:
her is ·the Secretary of State; Mr. Acheson. The Council has the
broad responsibility for implementing the Treaty.
Under the Council is the Defense Committee, the U. S.
member being the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Johnson. This com
�mittee has the responsibility for developing and maintaining the
·"'-, individual and collective capacity of the member countries to
resist aggression.
The Military Committee represents the military side of
the Organization, General Bradley being the U. S. member. This
Committee is comparable to a combined Chiefs of Staff organiza
tion. It is charged with the formulation of strategic and logistic
plans for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area.
The Standing Group is the day-to-day working organization,
and is located in the Pentagon Building. Five regional planning
groups have been established, which cover different areas·· of the
North Atlantic.
The Military Production and Supply Board is the supply
side of the organization. It might be said that the Military Pro
duction _and Supply Board bears the same relationship, in a gen
eral way, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the Muni
tions Board does to the Department of Defense. The U. S. mem
ber is Mr. Howard, who is also "the chairman of · the Munitions
Board. The day-to-day operations are performed by the Permanent
Working Staff, which is located in London.
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The Munitions Board is charged by
fense -vJit'.h the :dev�lopmenl
guidance for
<
the ''.Military Production ahd supply 'Board
sentative to the Pe�ma.nen:t
·Staff.

of

Workirig

the Secretary of De
the U. 'S. member 'of:
and the·
repre
The Murtitions Bo��d

tr.

s.

�hJ �p

iEf also responsible for' for�ufating, in coordination with
propriate executive departments and agencies, the tr� s� poJiti�n
on matters brought before the Military Production and Supply
B9ard.:
The initial: responsibilities of. the Board are:

' . (1) ·To d�velop ways and means of meeting material deficiencies
needed in support
strategic plans.

of

(2) To promote more efficient methods of production of mili
tary. equipme11t.
(3) To promote standardization of military equipment.
In brief; then, the Military Production and Supply. Board
is: an internationaJ agency. having the responsibility for developing
ways arid means for meeting ..the material deficiencies needed to

support North Atlantic Treaty strategic plans; for integrating
the production of milit.ary items by European signatories; and for
the promotion of standardization.
The Military Production and Supply Board. is still in its

infancy and progress has necessarily been slow. The second meet
in'g of the Boa�d was held at The. Hague on March 29th of this year.
Working on a twelve-nation basis under Mr. Howard's
chairmanship, the Board has accomplished all of the preliminary
work necessary to embark on a coordinated military production
program with the Treaty countries.

A review has been made of

the major deficiencies in military equipment for the support of the
North Atlantic Defense Plan, together with a survey of production
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capacity J11 Europe. The aid i� macpine tools
materiaJs. given
bythe Unit�d States for additional military production .in Europe
.

.' .

. ,

·'

•

.

i

'

..

will fit into
the over-all production sche�e
de�eloped
by
the . B�ard
.
.
..
' '
'
.
'·
· , ,.
.
.
The tempo of military production in Europe is stepping up, ,now.
, and will continue to do so.
A review of military equipment in Europe surplus to each
country's needs has also been made. In some cases transfers of

this equipment have been effected and transf�rs for ,the balance
, are being arranged. As you know a large part of Military Aid
given by the United States consists of. surplus
stock.
'
.:
.

Plans have been made and, in some �ses, production al

ready started in Europe to supply spare parts for U; S. equipment.

The Military Production and Supply Board has been di

rected by the Defense Committee to promote standardization of

equipment wherever possible.

This means that the Board will ad

vise regarding production of equipment selected by the Military

side of the organization.

Standardization, wherever possible, is a

most important adjunct of the North Atlantic Military Production

plan.

I have covered our major programs. I believe you are now

well aware of the fact that all our work in the Munitions Board
has a distinctly industrial flavor.

We recognize that the coopera

tion, advice, and direct participation of industry are essential to
our work.

Our plans must be workable.

To insure that industry .

will want to adopt our plans, it must participate in the,ir prepara

tion. Industry has participated directly in our programs that have

involved the surveying of productive capacity, the scheduling of

wartime production in individual plants, and carrying on engi� ·.·
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neering studies to improve our state of preparedness. Six hun;_
dred industrialists from all segments of industry serve on various
committees and sub-:eommittees and advise the Board and the
Board's staff on important problems.
Our objective is to prepare industrial plans that will give
America maximum security without militarizing our Nation or
bankrupting our economy. Each procedure we adopt and every
plan we develop are designed to buy time and to make it possible
for us to mobilize our industrial potential rapidly and effectively in
time of war. The participation of industry in the early stages of
our planning will insure industry's understanding and cooperation
in the event of an emergency.
Gentlemen, from my outline, I am sure you realize the scope
and importance of our problems. I am sure, as well, that you must
realize that the task is far from complete. May I ask you now,
irrespective of your future assignments, to give your actual and
moral support wherever you encounter our efforts.
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RECOMMENDED READING
This section lists material published in current periodicals
. which will be of interest and value to Navy officers.

"Going Overseas"
(Information of Interest to Personnel Being Transferred
Overseas) Marine Corps Gazette. May.
"Strategy of the Future-A Second Look"
By Cdr. George H. Miller, USN., U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings. May.
"The Hydrogen Bomb. III. Military Security Aspects"
"
By Robert F. Bacher. Scientific American. May.
"The Soviet Mentality As Seen at the U. N."
By Thomas J. Hamilton. N. Y. Times Magazine. April 30.
"Civil Defense Is Here To Stay"
By James H. Straubel. Air Force. May.
"Britain's Road Back"
By John Knox Jessup. Fortune. May.
"From Two Worlds To One"
By Raymond G. Swing� .The Nation. April 29.
"Germany: Time Bomb of Europe"
By Henry C. Wolfe. The American Mercury. May.
"A Program For Atomic Peace"
By Senator Brian McMahon. Reader's Digest. May.
"'How To Take The Offensive For Peace"
By John Foster Dulles. Life. April 24.
"What Can Ex-Communists Do?"
By Isaac Deutscher. The Reporter. April 25.
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.
Department of Correspondence Courses
MEMORANDUM
Volume II, No. 10, herewith forwarded, is the final
issue of Volume II of the "U. S. Naval War College In
formation Service for Officers," for the current year. If
you desire to continue your subscription for Volume III
(No. 1 will be issued in September, 1950), fill out the
form below, and forward promptly to the Department of
Correspondence Courses, Naval War College. Your pres
ent subscription will not be continued unless the above
procedure is followed.

U. S. Naval War College
Department of Correspondence Courses
Newport, Rhode Island

(Date)

It is requested that Volume III of the "U. S. Naval
War College Information Service for Officers" be mailed
to me at the following address :

(Rank, name, and service)

(Correct mailing address)

PRINT

PRINT

(Signature)
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